Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 25, Issue 6

2001

Article 1

Introduction
Thane Rosenbaum∗

∗

Copyright c 2001 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj

Introduction
Thane Rosenbaum

Abstract
The purpose of this special issue of the Fordham International Law Journal and the underlying
Symposium that was held on November 1, 2001 at Fordham Law School is to examine the moral
dimensions of the question of restitution in the aftermath of atrocity. This special edition will
specifically explore questions regarding restitution for victims of the Holocaust nearly sixty years
after the liberation of the concentration camps of Europe.

INTRODUCTION
Thane Rosenbaum*
The impulse and objective behind this special issue of the
Fordham InternationalLaw Journal-and the underlying Symposium that was held on November 1, 2001 at Fordham Law
School-is to examine the moral dimensions of an important
legal event, one that also had broad political and diplomatic implications.
All too often the legal and political spheres of society are
guardians only to a bureaucratically efficient, bottom line. They
seek to achieve correct results, but solely within the parameters
of legal rules and political agendas. What remains is the false
closure of a final judgment. Some legal and political remedies
are applied under the assumption that people can live with
them. But sometimes they can't. Sometimes those who look to
the legal system require more, and deserve more.
The law should commit itself to understanding what draws
people to the courthouse in the first place, what is missing emotionally from legal decisions, and what moral consequences are
ignored in order to achieve arguably correct legal outcomes.
The question of restitution in the aftermath of atrocity-or
in the case of this Symposium and accompanying articles, nearly
sixty years after the liberation of the concentration camps of Europe-is a perfect example of where moral imperatives need to
be reconciled with legal and political initiatives. In reviving discussions about dormant bank accounts and looted Jewish assets,
Stuart Eizenstat, Carl McCall, leaders of Jewish institutions and
governmental agencies, and a number of distinguished class action lawyers-essentially, many of the people who are participating in this Symposium and writing articles for this issue of the
Fordham InternationalLaw Journal-provided a fresh opportunity
to think broadly about what restitution means from a moral perspective.
These complex restitution efforts, undertaken on behalf of
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Holocaust survivors and Jewish institutions, also raise questions
about the strategies that were employed to achieve restitution,
and the remedies that were deemed satisfactory given the fact
that the underlying crime of genocide was committed sixty years
ago. The nature of these more recent restitution initiatives,
which involves the recovery and reallocation of stolen property,
looted assets, and compensation for slave labor, as well as the
creation of humanitarian funds, presents an entirely different
moral basis for restitution than the original crime of mass murder that first gave rise to these discussions decades ago.
The first question to ask is: Can there ever really be restitution? In the aftermath of genocide, there is no authentic way to
make victims whole again. After such unspeakable losses, how is
it possible to speak in terms of reparations? Reparations, after
all, assumes the possibilities of repair, which is impossible when
lives were so violently taken away. For millions of people in the
twentieth century, their future was canceled and so many children became instant orphans. A painting, a house, perhaps can
one day be returned to its true owner. But a murdered father
and all those children can never enjoy such a reunion. Nor is it
possible to achieve closure, because these are wounds that are
unhealable, and the losses are irreplaceable. Finding remedies
for mass murder is ultimately an end game with no possibility for
justice and final judgment. Every resolution is ultimately inadequate; the victims can never walk away satisfied.
So what is it that we mean when we speak of restitution,
which in itself is also a deficient word, but perhaps it is one that
is more emotionally neutral than the word reparations? The fact
is: while we can't truly compensate for the magnitude of these
crimes, morally speaking, we must do something to try, even if
we know that in the end, morally speaking, we are also destined
to fail. Restitution, even if insufficient and lacking, is notjust for
the victims, but for the perpetrators, and the silent witnesses, as
well. Survivors of atrocity must be assured that the memory of
what had happened to them is not forgotten, that there is no
statute of limitations on inhumanity, and even in the case of
looted assets and stolen bank accounts, self-interest, bad faith,
and greed are punishable, and those unjustly enriched will be
held legally accountable. This is the correct moral result even if
it presents legal and political challenges.
Restitution is also important as a way to force perpetrators
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to confront the enormity of their crimes and the repugnance of
their deeds. And it also places moral pressure on those who
were not directly guilty, but yet are still responsible for what was
done on their soil. And of course, the rest of humanity benefits
from restitution because it reminds bystanders of the moral duty
to act otherwise, and compels each of us to reject the poison of
complacency, indifference, and neglect.
But if memory is important, we also find that the legal system, and governmental diplomacy, tends to define restitution
solely in terms of money. Memory and money-they seem to go
hand in hand in the restitution business. But there is nothing
wrong with money. Indeed, even money has a moral component. Governments, banks, and insurance companies shouldn't
profit from their ill-gotten gains, and when money is what was
illegally taken, money is what should be morally returned. The
correct moral outcome is to divest those of the spoils of genocide, even if the proceeds can't be returned to their original
owners because they are dead.
But moral justice and restitution can also be achieved by
non-monetary remedies. Often what victims want, and what
moral justice demands, is the opportunity to have their stories
told, their losses counted, their pain acknowledged, as often as is
emotionally required. Moreover, similar to the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it is equally important
for the moral health of nations that perpetrators admit to what
they had done. And in the case of these recent Holocaust restitution initiatives, where decades have passed, it is morally necessary that nations inherit responsibility for the crimes and misdeeds of their fathers and grandfathers.
Moral justice requires acknowledgment as much as it does
money, because money will always be inadequate, but there can
be no value placed on truth. In an open atmosphere where
grievances are expressed and crimes acknowledged, there are
the possibilities for true expressions of shame, guilt, and apologies, and perhaps even forgiveness and reconciliation.
The aftermath of Auschwitz has taught us that human rights
must be framed in human, and moral terms. But what it means
to be human, and moral, includes as much of a respect for dignity as it does for property. Monetary remedies are creations of
legal justice. But when the quality of the underlying crime is so
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vast and unspeakable, moral justice must transcend the conventional remedy and address fundamental questions of human fulfillment and spiritual dignity. What, morally, do casualties of
mass death require, deserve and want as compensation? Money
is good, and appropriate, but what else can and should be done?
Yet dignity is that most abstract of human imperatives. How
can courts quantify it if it cannot be seen, measured or even validated? Dignity can be taken away, but how can it be returned?
Sometimes the elevation and acknowledgment of someone's
story is precisely what the victim wants, but the law often loses
sight of its obligation to provide forums not solely for achieving
some measure of rough justice, but also for the more refined
healing power, and simple eloquence, that comes from truth.
Ordinary law, dealing with the mundane transactional matters of life, can satisfy itself with remedies that focus on compensating the individual for lost wages, property and injuries to the
body. But human rights and genocide demand human and
moral satisfaction. The burdens are high for those who are
charged with dispensing justice in such extreme cases of outright
deprivation and mass murder. In all cases it requires a far more
complex and expansive vision of what a legal and moral remedy
should be, even if hopelessly inadequate because the nature of
the crimes is, by definition, beyond redress.
For these reasons, restitution can and should include the
rebuilding of communities, the search for historical truth, and
punishment by way of either legal trials or condemnation from
the court of public opinion. Such remedies can also provide
moral justice because they look beyond the injury to the body
and contemplate the full magnitude of human and communal
loss.
Yet, class actions, given their prominence in the Holocaust
restitution arena, have a way of depriving claimants of an opportunity to preserve their individual claims and to participate
meaningfully in the process. There is a tragic irony in reducing
victims of concentration camps-many of whom possess limbs
still tattooed with identifying, self-annihilating numbers-to a
broad class of similarly numbered litigants, their individual stories silenced, their participation in the outcome hijacked by the
time-saving efficiencies of the civil court system.
And allocating some of the proceeds of restitution for gen-
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eral humanitarian purposes rather than to Holocaust survivors
directly, along with the question of what to do with property that
was acquired in good faith but once belonged to a victim of genocide, presents its own set of moral dilemmas. Also, morally,
who should speak for the victims of genocide? And are there
ever innocent bystanders when it comes to mass death and its
aftermath?
Of course, that's why we are engaged in these discussionsto think about the difficult moral issues that gives rise to restitution, and the moral justice that we expect from restitution. In
the end we know how important morality is in these circumstances. After all, we are compelled to apply legal rules and invoke the full force of governmental pressure all because of the
moral decline of what was the Holocaust.

